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Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation process facilitated 
the cementation of a particular apartheid-era victim subject position. In particular, I show the 
enduring effects on lived victim subjectivities. I hence look at the TRC as a form of governance 
and trace its effects on the social, political and legal realm in its aftermath.2  
Victimhood is chiefly embodied. I argue that the embodiment of experiences of violence 
is both the basis for and the limit to the articulation of one’s victimhood. Whereas shared 
experiences of victimhood foster sociality among victims, in order to be politically effective, 
victims need to relate to dominant victim subject position. This requires the emancipation from 
the bodily dimension of victimhood. To be sure, experiences of violence are, by definition, 
social – and political. The focus here is on the conditions for the emergence of a political victim 
subjectivity – as a basis for social i.e. collective action – in the context of a legalized, politicized 
but also bureaucratic notion of apartheid-era victimhood.  
Given that the effects of distinctive forms of governance become evident in the 
relationship between politics and individuals, they allow for certain kinds of social actions and 
invalidate others. If individuals attempt to make their subjectivities politically effective, they 
have to do so in the context of existing forms of governance. People may try to change the 
empirically given forms or adopt them as their ideals. In such processes, new forms of 
articulation emerge or given ones stabilize. I thus look at the contingencies of the formation of 
the political in victims’ everyday lives and question whether we have truly understood the reach 
of “top-down” processes of governance and the possibilities for the emergence of “bottom-up” 
governance arrangements.  
In the part “victim subject positions”, I first rely on literature suggesting how the TRC 
– as a quasi-judicial institution (Wilson 2000, p. 80) – partly succeeded in cementing a 
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particular victim subject position which is very much legally oriented. I will then show that this 
way of governing through differentiation has met contestation which was mainly fought in 
courts, both domestically and abroad. The TRC was consequential for the standing of apartheid-
era victims in its aftermath. Due to its strong emphasis on victimhood which was necessary for 
successful nation-building, the TRC facilitated the (albeit incomplete) formalization of 
victimhood in post-apartheid South Africa. Also, the limitations of its work were weighed 
stronger by victims and advocacy groups than the state’s assurance that the past was dealt with. 
The Commission thus enabled alternative interpretations of victimhood. 
The main part of the article relies on my empirical material of the everyday in victims’ 
lives.3  In order to understand the shift between a lived and an articulated and politically 
successfully articulated victimhood – in relation to discursively dominant subject positions of 
victimhood –, I developed a typology of four states of societal experience. I then argue that 
victimhood is sedimented in the body and is, as an experience, inherently and persistently bound 
to the body. Any political articulation is thus chiefly informed by – and contingent to – 
persistent sedimented knowledge of various kinds of injury. Whilst victimhood enables 
solidarity amongst victims as they have similar experiences, it also creates boundaries between 
the “irreconcilable” individual and society. There is thus an increasingly articulated division 
between victims who struggle to overcome their state of being and those who have managed to 
live in the “new South Africa”. The legal developments are manifestations of this tension. They 
hold the possibility of a shift in victim subjectivity but they remain ambivalent in their focus 
on a legal victim subject position. 
This trajectory of governance will allow me to do two things. On the one hand, I can 
relate governance to individually attempted articulations of victim subjectivity. I thereby 
chiefly argue for experience or habit memories (Connerton 1989) as a major driving factor for 
agency.4 On the other hand, I reflect on the limits of a politically successful articulation of 
victimhood and the limits of the political per se. I argue that knowledge sedimented in the body 
is the source of any political articulation. However, based on my empirical material, I also argue 
that a victim subjectivity – in order to be politically effective and applicable in relation to 
dominant discourses of victimhood – seems to demand a certain emancipation from the bodily 
experience of victimhood. 
Speaking to the transversal themes of this volume, this will lead me to suggest that the 
concept of governance needs to be expanded with the embodiment of experiences as one of the 
bases of, and limits to, (collective) agency. 
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Victim Subject Positions 
The TRC’s strong impact on the idea of transition, nation-building and a new South 
Africa has been extensively dealt with in the literature.5 Less prominent has been its role in the 
production of a particular victim subject position. In various legal disputes following the TRC, 
the mandate of the TRC, the limitations of its work and its final report were used as an authority 
justifying the respective positions. I argue that these ongoing legal processes have, despite being 
partly detrimental to the victims’ cause at first, brought legitimization and negotiating power to 
those who stand in for the recognition of victims of apartheid-era human rights violations in 
todays South Africa. 
In the work of the TRC, a particular victim subject position emerged. Formally, the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 noted the definition of a victim.6 
In order to qualify the cause of the injuries, suffering and loss, the Act also defined what a gross 
violation of human rights constitutes.7 It is defined in its more narrow form as violations of civil 
and political rights and singled out four “gross” violations (killing, abduction, torture and severe 
ill treatment) which had to be verifiable and tied to an individual perpetrator8 and committed 
with a political motive. As such, the selection of persecuted violations did cohere with the 
notion of perpetrator versus victim that informed the Commission’s work more generally, a 
notion that omitted reference to the many beneficiaries of apartheid (Mamdani 2002). Hence, 
individual and direct perpetration and visible injuries were fore grounded at the cost of the 
recognition of structural violence in its complexity.9 Ross (2002) noted that considering 
apartheid “in terms of excess phrased as violation of certain rights” had the effect of “flattening 
and homogenizing the complex moral terrain of the everyday” (2002, p. 163). Experience as 
such was sidelined.10 
The definitions through which the framework of the TRC’s work was outlined became 
operational once the Commission started its work and they became effective when it actually 
defined some 21’000 South Africans as victims and declined the status to others.11 In its activity, 
according to Ross, the TRC focused on “the embodied consequences of authored events of 
violence” (2002, p. 165) and thus applied a narrow focus on violations of bodily integrity. It 
considered “its subject in terms of injury” (2002, p. 11) and worked with a “body-bound” notion 
of victimhood. Moreover, the “victim” was not an enduring subject, someone with a complex 
history, but rather a subject born of violence.12 Ross calls this a “legal person”, a “victim 
produced through occupation of the signs of injury” (2002, p. 12).13 Also, the Commission 
promoted the necessity to verbalise experience through the “equation of speaking subject with 
 4 
healed subject” (2002, p. 165). This meant, pragmatically, that it was only through speaking 
that applicants could claim their status as victims. 
The TRC thus governed by distinguishing between those falling into its category of 
injuries sustained and those failing to meet the requirements; it further distinguished between 
those who testified and those choosing not to14 or having missed the opportunity to do so; it 
distinguished between those who were entitled to financial redress and those who were not. But 
only few victims were able to fully claim ‘victim’ status. 
The TRC’s version of victimhood had an important impact on the South African society, 
but it was not totally accepted. Instead, it fostered a societal discussion that transformed the 
possibilities that victims had for articulating their claims. 
One important organized form of articulation has been the South African apartheid-era 
victims' support group Khulumani.15 In its advocacy programs, it claims to represent around 65 
000 victims of apartheid-era human rights violations.16 Over its 12 years of existence, it has 
come to represent a different notion of violations and human rights than the TRC has 
propagated. It focuses on the needs which have arisen from the effects of human rights 
violations, broadly defined.17 It petitions the state to fulfil its duty to ensure equality of chances 
and conditions for every South African in a country in transition. It is thus less interested in the 
actual violations or the causes of today’s suffering and inequality than in the aspects that need 
repairing today.18 Khulumani’s and other civil society organizations’ legal actions have evoked 
legal and political responses regarding how victimhood should be understood in post-apartheid 
and post-TRC South Africa. 
The Truth Commission’s mandate was controversial from the beginning. In addition to 
the lively public debates on its mission and shape, a core provision of the TRC Bill was 
challenged in the Constitutional Court (Giannini et al. 2009, p. 19). In Azanian People’s 
Organization (AZAPO) and Others vs. The President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, victims alleged that the authority to grant amnesty to perpetrators deprived victims of 
particular rights as protected in the Interim Constitution of 1995, as it waived both civil and 
criminal liability.19 Although the Constitutional Court ruled that the granting of amnesty was 
indeed constitutional, it also made clear that perpetrators who failed to satisfy the amnesty 
requirements could face civil and criminal charges. It thus argued that victims were not 
absolutely deprived of the right to seek legal recourse.20 Almost a decade later, amendments to 
the Prosecution Policy were promulgated by the Ministry of Justice.21 The changes relate to the 
prosecution of offences “emanating from conflicts of the past” and they guide the prosecutors 
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in their discretion whether to grant indemnity to perpetrators who committed crimes that were 
politically motivated before 1994. Civil society organizations filed a challenge to the 
amendments.22 In 2008, the High Court in Pretoria found that the policy amendments did in 
effect amount to a “copy-cat” of the TRC amnesty process and struck down the amendments.23 
In the same year, Mbeki created a Reference Group to make recommendations to him 
with regard to which offenders who were convicted of offences committed in pursuit of political 
objectives before 1994 should receive presidential pardon. The South African Coalition of 
Transitional Justice24 launched an urgent application in the North Gauteng Court, arguing that 
such process would unlawfully exclude victims.25 The respondents, the President and the 
Minister of Justice, argued that the victims had no right to be heard when the President exercised 
his power to grant pardon.26 The Court ruled that the President must, prior to releasing a prisoner 
on pardon, consider “the inputs of victims and/or families of the victims”.27 
Parallel to these domestic developments, the apartheid litigations filed in U.S. Courts in 
2002 caused much turbulence and opposition in South Africa. The apartheid litigations 
Balintulo et al vs. Daimler AG et al. (henceforth Khulumani case) and Ntsebeza et al. vs. 
Daimler Chrysler Corporation et al. allege that a number of international corporations aided 
and abetted the security branches of the apartheid regime in the perpetration of human rights 
violations.28 With these civil cases, South African citizens seek to bring corporations to trial in 
U.S. courts on the basis of common law principles of liability and under the Alien Tort Statute.29 
Seven years after submission of the complaints, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District 
Court of New York allowed the class actions to proceed.30 The South African government had 
been opposing the apartheid litigations from an early stage.31 It argued that the litigations would 
pre-empt the South African government’s ability to handle domestic matters of reconstruction 
and reconciliation internally and transgress its sovereignty and they would discourage 
investment in the South African economy.32 Only in September 2009, the South African 
government half-heartedly withdrew its opposition.33 
In sum, in its attempts to build a post-apartheid political order, the state has shown little 
interest in the victims of apartheid-era human rights violations beyond the TRC process. 
Victims’ agendas, in spite of this official disregard, have moved towards the centre of the 
political stage in the aftermath of the TRC and after a considerable time lag. Three domestic 
cases and one U.S. instance of litigation have led to an official legitimization of victims’ 
demands. 
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Through the findings of the TRC as to who constitutes a victim and who does not, a 
typical interventionist governance measure was enacted. I showed the limits of this 
interventionist measure by outlining its contestation both politically and in courts. The legal 
and political developments after the TRC show that the TRC’s stance on the definition of 
victims was not confined to the conditions under which it was created, but developed a logic of 
its own. Both the interventionist measure and the contestation influenced the formation of 
political victim subjectivities. I will now turn to this particular aspect of governance. 
Victimhoods 
Processes of governance have effects on the everyday life of those directly addressed 
and those left out. In the case at hand, both those who are beneficiaries of officially recognized 
victim status and those who are unrecognized negotiate their status as victims in larger society. 
In this reality, a politically successful articulation of one’s victim subjectivity is dependent on 
the fact that victimhood in grounded in bodily experiences. By arguing that any articulation of 
victimhood has to engage with bodily experiences, I also attempt to show that precisely because 
of the sedimented character of victimhood, the formation of the political has limits for victims 
themselves. The political reaches its limits and governance may be more consequential than 
originally conceptualized. 
The dominant victim subject positions elaborated above tend not to acknowledge a 
bodily grounded victimhood and discursively detach experience from status. The four accounts 
which follow below show that amongst victims, the bodily dimension of victimhood meets 
understanding, compassion and may be the basis for common political action. In relation to 
larger society, however, a specific victim subjectivity is not connectable and meets with a lack 
of understanding and the refusal to solidarize. It makes political communication more difficult 
than it is often assumed. Political effectiveness demands to comply with certain conventions of 
articulating one’s victimhood. My empirical material suggests that one of the effects seems to 
be the dissipation of bodily experience as raw source of articulation as victims engage with 
more standardized forms of victim subject positions. 
In order to understand the shift from lived to articulated and to politically articulated 
victimhood, I developed a typology of four states of societal experience: 
(1) I speak of victimhood as a state of being of a victim of human rights violations. This 
state is self-ascribed and genuinely intimate and personal as an experience.34 It is not necessarily 
a conscious state. Once a person becomes conscious of his or her victimhood and publicly 
performs it, the role of victimhood in the person changes. (2) I call the new position victim 
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subjectivity. When taking this position, someone’s personhood comes into a relation with forms 
of (3) victim subject positions. Victims subject positions are often dominant discourses which 
give ideas/ideals of what a victim is or is supposed to be. This status is necessarily political, as 
any articulation of one’s subjectivity is taking place in a context of discourses. Although 
subjectivity is always political, I distinguish between victim subjectivity and (4) political victim 
subjectivity. I only speak of political victim subjectivity when a person or a group publicly 
articulates victimhood in a relation to a specific form of victim subject position (for instance, 
the TRC, the ANC, the legal complaints, the neighbors; Khulumani). The attribute political thus 
demands a positioning, consciously or not, vis-à-vis prevailing (and often dominant) ideas of 
victimhood. 
Of course, these different positions are not clear-cut and aspects of victimhood may 
occupy different positions of this typology. Particularly the shift from victimhood to victim 
subjectivity has, in varying degrees, already happened in most of my encounters because my 
research took place in the context of a victims’ support group. 
Embodied victimhood 
In Sebokeng, a township in Southern Gauteng and in the former Transvaal, a group of 
women meet regularly. They identify themselves as victims of widowhood as a consequence of 
violence generally associated with the wars between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hostel 
dwellers and the ANC in the early 1990s. The casualties often were ordinary community 
members. Almost 100 members are listed in one of the executives’ notebook. Together, the 
widows run small-scale income-generating projects like sowing and beading or projects for 
their subsistence such as a communal garden. They act under the umbrella of Khulumani. 
After one day of workshop, a round of women gathered and wanted to tell me some of 
their stories.35 Dikeledi Mabaso [name changed] spoke after several others had spoken. Her 
husband was killed in a massacre in which 38 people were shot on a Sunday in 1990.36 On 
Monday, her husband went to the crime scene, a hostel, to see whether a relative of theirs was 
wounded or killed. However, he was shot right away, Ms Mabaso said in tears. The arrival of 
the IFP in the Vaal was a problem, she continued. It caused their husbands to die.37 There was 
no breadwinner left in their families as their children still went to school when their husbands 
were killed. Also the government seemed to have forgotten them, she said, shaking. Even their 
families made fun of them, the widows, whereas before they had had their respect.38 In response 
to my question, she confirmed that the ANC offered a burial to her late husband since he was a 
member. However, Ms Mabaso would have liked to see the erection of a memorial and witness 
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the ceremony of unveiling it.39 The government forgot the widows, she said, winding down. The 
politicians were enjoying their luxurious lives with their families and wives but forgot about all 
those women left alone. She was very sick, Ms Mabaso said in closing, she suffers from high 
blood pressure and diabetes. 
Her friends comforted her and complemented her story. Ms Mabaso looked very old, 
sorrowful and generally drained with an expression of deep helplessness on her face. With her 
whole posture and personhood, she underlined her loss and her feeling of being left alone. The 
others said to me later that she had not talked about herself before; and they were more confident 
than I was that it had done her good. Her account was raw and she was clearly not used to 
perform her victimhood in a verbal and public manner.  
It was one of many situations which I experienced in the course of my research, where 
it became evident how much incorporated victimhood is and how crucially victimhood is linked 
to the body. Arguing famously for the impossibility of expressing pain, Scarry (1985) also 
suggests that the human body can be the “referent” for “felt-attributes” which are lifted “into 
the visible world”. It is one way of how the “sentient fact of the person’s suffering” can become 
“knowable” to a second person (1985, p. 13). For Scarry, the body therefore refers to something 
which is not transmittable in its original form and which necessarily undergoes translation. The 
body may be a means to communicate one’s sentient victimhood to another. 
Indeed, in some instances during my research, the “sheer material factualness of the 
human body” (1985, p. 14) played into expressing one’s victim subjectivity. In moments when 
words seem to let a person down, the factualness of the human body should speak for itself. 
Sometimes, I was shown scars of injuries sustained. Generally, neither women nor men would 
uncover more than their shinbone or calf to show scars, though. The verbal reference to bullets 
in the chest or lack of scalp hair as a result of torture in its potentiality would suffice. Such 
demonstration was not supposed to make the difference in people’s sentient victim subjectivity. 
Rather it served to communicate a subject position as stipulated in various discourses as, for 
instance, the logic of law and evidence (Connerton 1989, pp. 96–100). These gestures seemed 
to refer to discourses which are believed to require that kind of evidence: inscribed according 
to Connerton, in order to serve as an “objective” sign of injury. Scars may thus be a necessary 
tool to communicate incorporated (Connerton 1989) injury to others in order to meet 
credibility. The body may serve as a place of evidence or a means of communicating victim 
subjectivity but to make this a requirement for the recognition of a victim subject position is, 
for obvious reasons, highly problematic. For if we take the body as the single evidence for 
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sustained injuries and even psychological damage, we privilege a cognitive view of the body 
which draws on the idea that the body is “readable” as a text or code (1989, p. 101). Such 
“reading” attempts to expand the hermeneutic privilege to incorporation by simply perpetuating 
a textual reading of practice to the “non-textual” and “non-cognitive” realm. This is based on a 
flawed understanding of bodily mnemonics. It privileges the inscribed and ignores the 
persistence of “what is being incorporated” (1989, p. 102) and, in effect, the habitual nature of 
bodily experiences. Like all bodily experiences, incorporated victimhood does not persist 
independently from one’s being. 
The body is not just an argument for a victim subjectivity, it is an integral part of an 
argument of victim subjectivity. The body absorbs exhaustion, stress and sorrows, and injuries 
on the bodies manifest themselves as confusion, fits, depression, uneasiness, incapability to 
socialize and so forth. However, it is precisely due to the fact that the body is integral part of 
the argument of victim subjectivity that political articulation may fail. Victimhood poses 
nonnegotiable boundaries. It may undergo shifts and changes. But the body is injured and 
scarred forever because experiences have turned into habit memories which are sedimented in 
the body. Habit here should be understood as a “continuously practiced activity”, thus 
emphasizing a sense of operativeness and the reinforcing effect of repeated acts (Connerton 
1989, p. 94). 
Amongst the widows of Sebokeng, Ms Mabasa momentarily met solidarity and comfort 
with an extraordinary effort of emotions and exposure. However, her victimhood has become 
part of her self as much that she struggles to emancipate from it towards a form of articulation 
which is discursively connectable to political action around victimhood.40 Hence, pain creates 
solidarity amongst those who have experienced it but creates boundaries to those who have not. 
Victim subjectivity differentiates and causes rifts which are difficult to bridge. 
The formation of a political community based on individual dissent 
The way society thinks victimhood should be lived has an effect on the individual. It 
has a potential to outcast or alienate people. Shared experience of victimhood may be the basis 
for political action precisely because it is based on shared exclusion. For some, Khulumani 
offers an alternative gaze on their own personhood and an escape from the judgment of society. 
The following account shows that solidarity amongst victims may trump societal judgment of 
how victimhood is supposed to be lived. It also shows that society struggles to relate to victims’ 
experiences and reacts with lack of understanding if people try to make their victimhood 
effective. 
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In September 2009, Mr. Phelane [name changed] came to the Khulumani Western Cape 
office, Salt River, Cape Town, to apply for membership and to ask for assistance in his 
application for a Special Pension Grant.41 He was told to come back the next morning and bring 
along the relevant documents. An executive member informed me that a “direct victim” was 
coming. On that day, Mr. Phelane was angry and emotional. He was anxious to document what 
he had to say using the respective papers. He spoke to the office manager, an executive member 
and myself. Other people who applied for membership were present and the office manager 
handled a couple of cases simultaneously. 
Mr. Phelane was in prison from 1994 to 2005; on which charges he did not elaborate. 
During that time, he made a preliminary statement to the TRC and received Interim 
Reparations. Although he also qualified for the individual reparations of R30 000, he never 
received the money.42 According to Mr. Phelane, his father gave the extensive statement without 
authorization from him. The money was subsequently deposited on his father’s account. The 
statement-taker never approached Mr. Phelane for his consent. At this stage of his account, the 
office manager interrupted and said that she had indeed heard of this statement-taker. He had 
spread the information of the running of the TRC very selectively and monopolized it to his 
friends. It was because of him that she had not heard of the TRC on time and had missed the 
opportunity to give a statement. She accused him of having teamed up with people giving 
statements on behalf of others and having claimed his share of the deal. 
Mr. Phelane asked his wife and other relatives to come and visit him in prison. They 
said that they did not have sufficient money for the journey to the prison. His father spent R15 
000 on a car and spread R14 000 equally between his three daughters, and assumingly the 
remaining R1 000 to the statement-taker. On his deathbed, his father was haunted by a guilty 
conscience. He asked his three daughters to give the money to their brother; but they never did 
so. They stick together like “The Three Musketeers”, Mr. Phelane complained. He has had 
many meetings with lawyers to get his money back. It was hopeless, he said, the attorney in the 
Magistrate Court was bribed by his sister. He was also disappointed by LegalWise, the legal 
advice agency and insurance. “I gave up on the judiciary.” When he told us about the injuries 
he sustained, the office manager noted them in the organization’s Needs Assessment Form 
(which is at the same time the application form for membership). In 1976, he was shot in his 
chest. He still has the x-ray photograph. He also has 37 rubber bullet shots in his back. “The 
system made us bad.” He made clear that he wanted to bring the statement-taker and the First 
National Bank, which transferred the money, to accountability. 
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Mr. Phelane’s account was in parts confusing and incoherent. With its anger, 
accusations, frustration and disillusionment with bureaucracies and legal institutions, it 
resembled the accounts of many others who came to the Khulumani office, often to ask for 
assistance as a last resort after many failed attempts to receive what they thought they were 
entitled to. His account is also not exceptional in that a real or promised pay-out has caused 
rifts in families, jealousy, and sometimes threats and violence in family and community.  
Mr. Phelane is acknowledged as a victim by the TRC, hence formally, he is a “good 
victim” to society. But as a person and with his actions, he does not comply with the notion of 
a “good victim”.43 He was in prison for the first 12 years into democracy. He is not only a victim 
but possibly also a perpetrator, quarrels with his families over money, and is not useful for a 
new beginning. This might be so precisely because he is a victim and struggles to integrate into 
a society which he was first estranged from and which he is being alienated from today. This 
contradiction which society prefers not to see underlines the effects of the past and undermines 
sociability and solidarity with him. 
Khulumani, however, offers solidarity with those who have in common both their 
victimhood and their difficulties to integrate and to grab the supposed chances. They have not 
“made it” in the new South Africa. Mr. Phelane’s probable delinquency is noticed but it is seen 
in a broader context of a fight for dignity and acknowledgment. The commonalities are 
therefore prioritized over the differences. The office manager could relate to his account 
because she thinks to know the person who collaborated with his family to appropriate his 
money from her own experiences of exclusion. She identifies with his victimhood caused by 
allegedly corrupt state officials. The executive member may relate to him as he has also been 
in jail a couple of times since 1994 on charges of stabbing in attacks of rage. The ambivalence 
towards the part of society which “made it” remains for all those who declare their victimhood 
of past experiences as an act of positioning themselves in the present time. It is an urge to belong 
despite victimhood and possibly perpetration. Khulumani offers a space to belong due to 
victimhood. Based on a common experience of an exclusive notion of victimhood, an 
alternative sense of community may emerge. 
In the South African majority opinion, the question of victimhood is resolved since 1994 
or at the latest since the closing of the TRC. There is strong pressure to comply with the ANC’s 
approach to reconciliation and forgiveness for which the TRC as a reference is pivotal (Wilson 
2000, Borer 2003, p. 1092, Humphrey 2005). Everyone should try to re-integrate into society 
and take his or her rightful place, build the future of the new South Africa, and be useful to 
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society. S/he should reconcile; some may still suffer from long-term effects and be marked, but 
they should at least be willing to integrate. If victims try to foreground the ongoing 
consequences of past sufferings and to render them politically effective, such reminders 
challenge both the break with the past and the hopes for the future. They are resented as 
ungrateful egotism, and seen as proofs of the speakers’ incapability of being integrated. The 
acknowledgment of a person’s victimhood should instead be smooth, sociable and generous – 
and not threaten to evoke bad memories or to challenge one’s own success in the “new South 
Africa”. 
For many, Khulumani is, at first, just another place to turn to with administrative 
problems. Once the contact made, many learn about the possibility of sociability in their 
victimhood. A victim subject position may, in some ways, be transformed into conscious victim 
subjectivity. Mr. Phelane had heard that Khulumani would provide help for Special Pension 
applications. He was surprised to find sympathy and articulation of shared concerns. One 
executive member said once to me: „Khulumani is a one stop shop“ and another complemented: 
“We are an advise office”, marvelling at the very many perceptions people have of what 
Khulumani would be able to help them with. The application for membership is not a quick 
bureaucratic process and it is not completed by an employee with little relation to his/her work 
and the life-worlds of the applicants. It is received by someone who can relate to the experience 
of the applicant and act intersubjectively to his/her story. In most cases, it is a very local story 
with specific protagonists and incidences which only someone who him/herself has lived in the 
townships in the years of struggle can understand and give value to. 
Despite inconsistencies it was clear that Mr. Phelane had told his story before. He was 
emotional but his account was also structured along institutions which he approached in his 
capacity as a victim and which accepted or rejected him on the basis of his victimhood. His 
account was thus not raw as Ms Mabaso’s but more eloquent in articulating his frustration over 
the lack of recognition The bodily experience of victimhood shows through in the form of body-
bound evidence (such as the x-ray and the bullet wounds). Albeit having had little success in 
making his victim subjectivity financially effective, he is not helpless in approaching 
institutions for support. His claims are, amongst other things, based on the formal recognition 
of victim status by the Commission. 
Dominant notion of victimhood versus individual dissent 
The general notion of apartheid-era victimhood in South African today potentially 
clashes with individual dissent. The political is formed in relation to the dominant notion of 
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how victimhood should be lived and performed. The following example shows how an 
individual directly contests the effects of the dominant victim subject position as promoted 
largely by the African National Congress. Such acts of articulation risk to meet strong 
opposition and risk to be dismissed as unpatriotic, selfish or weak, as I also showed above when 
discussing government’s reactions to the apartheid litigations. They are risky also because 
victim subjectivity is chiefly linked to the private and the intimate experiences of the individual. 
Amanda Mabilisa ties her victim subjectivity to an active non-membership in the ANC. 
In 2009 when we spent two weeks together, she had just stood for Congress of the People 
(COPE) Women’s League at the party’s first national elections. In her own account, she 
chronicles the corrupt apartheid state and the biased post-apartheid state. She had abandoned 
school in Swaziland in 1973 and was, as she emphasizes, the only female member of the South 
African Students’ Organisation who was first hidden and later smuggled out of the country after 
the 1976 Soweto Uprising. Her life in exile then brought her to Lesotho, Botswana, Nigeria and 
Germany, from which she returned to South Africa in 1995 only. Her certificate as a nurse 
trained in Germany in the 1980/90s has never been accredited in South Africa. Her refusal to 
assume ANC membership has been an expression of her self-image as a non-corruptible 
cosmopolitan thoroughly rooted in her community. She calls herself a “politician”. 
One night, Ms Mabilisa took me to her neighbor’s house in which he runs a shebeen in 
the back yard room. Some male friends and she frequently meet there for soccer, debates and 
beer. She is ambivalent about some of them. They were well positioned ANC cadres and came 
to the township to show off their cars on weekends and otherwise enjoy a comfortable life in 
the suburbs, she muttered. The four men present that night were indeed dressed in suit and tie 
and had a worldly flair about them. At some stage, one of the men, a senior official, argued that 
a multi-party system does not work in Africa. To prove this, he referred to the post-election 
violence in Kenya in 2007 and Barack Obama’s Dreams from My Father. He implied, and 
obviously this was not the first time they had this discussion, that Amanda Mabilisa excluded 
herself knowingly and deliberately if she did not partake in ANC politics. 
The conversation turned to a discussion of the ANC’s integrity and Ms Mabilisa 
mentioned a document which, she claimed, proved that Chris Hani was killed by Umkhonto we 
Sizwe comrades.44 Another man in the round, a former mayor, was deeply upset by this 
accusation (which made news several years ago). “I think I am with the wrong people!”; he was 
about to leave the room. The officer mediated: documents, he said, are easily counterfeited. 
And anyway, he had read the three (sic!) volumes of the TRC’s Final Report, and nothing of 
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such sort was mentioned there. Ms Mabilisa said triumphantly that this was exactly part of the 
“unfinished business of the TRC” her organization Khulumani had been advocating to clear. 
The officer replied that he saw no reason for her to engage in such thoughts; it would only harm 
her and her career. The conversation stopped and everyone reverted to more drinking. 
Ms. Mabilisa’s company that evening suggested that she should let sleeping dogs lie. 
They generally acknowledged that injuries of the past still impact on the lives of South Africans 
today, but rejected individualized grievances whose expression they see as unreasonably 
holding on to the past. The TRC has dealt with that. Both quote the TRC as a reference of 
authority and knowledge. The senior official cited its Final Report as a canonical document 
with truth value, substantiating the ANC’s role as author of a transformation that, by now, is 
accomplished. Ms Mabilisa, in turn, referred to the TRC’s limitations and shortcomings. She 
did not foreground her sentient victimhood but made her political victim subjectivity effective 
in an routinized political argument in a private setting in which the people present drew on their 
public influence and importance for their arguments. She made a structural argument and was 
confronted with an individualistic, liberal response. Although it was at no point threatening to 
get out of hand, the recognition of individual choices was at stake. 
I witnessed in several situations that Ms Mabilisa is readily listened to and easily finds 
favor in other circles - youth and women groups, COPE members or protest movements for 
service delivery. Her victim subjectivity proves widely effective. Due to her status as an 
important struggle veteran, she finds ways of expressing her standpoint and ascertaining her 
individuality, contrary to Ms Mabaso and Mr. Phelane. Her personal bodily experience of 
victimhood is in the background and gives way to persuasive argumentation of structural 
victimhood and biased politics. Victimhood as a personal experience is manifest as emphatic 
argumentation. It is not communicated in its raw and intimate form which makes it possible to 
come up against a strong discourse of the finished past. 
The formation of the political and the emancipation from embodied experiences 
The last situation directly addresses the basis for the formation of the political. I argue 
that successful politicization requires emancipation from the bodily dimension of victimhood 
experiences.  
In the following account, victims and a representative of law meet. In this situation, it 
is the law that helps to form political victim subjectivities. Legal ways of thinking about 
victimhood and personhood as such are not effective on victims’ personhood, though. Only 
when they enter the political realm do they become tangible elements of victims’ subjectivities. 
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What does this mean for my life and my future? and Am I socially and politically recognized in 
my state as a victim? are questions that transform law-making into a tangible reality in victims’ 
lives. In this form, law can be a basis for the formation of the political. 
Khulumani Western Cape, unlike many other provincial branches, holds regular 
monthly general meetings since its consolidation into Khulumani’s national structure in 1999.45 
At short notice, Charles Abrahams, the South African legal advisor to the Khulumani apartheid 
litigation filed in the U.S., spoke to the membership at the October 2010 meeting.46 If rumors 
circulate that he will be coming to a meeting, the Ashley Kriel Hall at the Community House 
in Salt River, Cape Town, is typically packed with members. So it was this time; more than 200 
people attended. For members, the lawyer’s presence reasserts professional and international 
support for their everyday struggles and suffering. By way of his profession and his faithfulness 
to Khulumani, Mr. Abrahams constitutes an authority who is trusted. In addition, every 
announcement that he is going to speak to the membership is accompanied with hopes and 
rumors that there might be a pay-out from a settlement in the lawsuit. Those members who are 
better informed are usually glad that he speaks, because his talks give short-term clarification 
of technical and political matters and tend to momentarily brush away rumors, ill perceptions 
and accusations of misappropriation. Given that information is communicated predominantly 
orally among members and between the executive and members, there is room for 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations. In turn, such orality gives more authority to those 
who are chosen to speak or appoint themselves to speak. Mr. Abrahams is well versed in 
speaking from a perspective comprehensible to members without undermining the complexity 
and contingency of the law. All these aspects give him a certain monopoly of definition, in 
other words: normative power. The meeting at hand was particular in that specific constellations 
allowed members’ articulation of the most critical stance towards government I had yet heard 
in Khulumani meetings. I will show that, facilitated by the lawyer, the law allowed members to 
momentarily and temporarily emancipate from their embodied experiences by taking on a 
political perspective on their collective victimhood. This, in turn, offered a basis for collective 
action. 
The apartheid litigations were still pending at the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
at the time. Just a month before, September 17, 2010, three judges of the Appeals Court issued 
an opinion in a related case which was a blow to the international human rights community. In 
Kiobel versus Shell, the Nigerian plaintiffs allege that Shell was complicit for torture and crimes 
against humanity committed in the Ogoni region of Nigeria by allegedly collaborateding with 
the military regime of Nigeria in the 1990s. The majority ruling of the Appeal Court decision 
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denied the liability of corporations for the violation of international law.47 The plaintiffs were 
expected to file a petition for rehearing the case.48 In short, and Mr. Abrahams communicated 
that to me before it was his turn to speak, he had the difficult task of conveying the bad prospects 
this parallel case indicated for the apartheid litigation without demoralizing members or 
understating the contingencies of such cases. 
After members sang joyously, Charles Abrahams thus opened his address to the 
membership as follows: “As most of you know, I always talk about the lawsuit. Sometimes I 
bring good news, and sometimes I bring bad news. Or sometimes I just bring news. Now today 
I am going to bring just news. I am not sure whether it’s good or bad; you must decide.” He 
briefed the membership on the hearing of the defendants’ appeal on Judge Shira Scheindlin’s 
decision to allow the apartheid cases to proceed. Out of three judges, Mr. Abrahams singled out 
Judge Cabranes: “He is a bit of a terrible judge”. He is the very same judge who strongly argued 
against the liability of companies under international law in the Kiobel versus Shell opinion. 
The first comment from the membership was from a man who thanked Mr. Abrahams 
for not sparing them with the facts. He said, as translated by executive member Zukiswa 
Puwana: “It is encouraging to see that as lawyers you are not just sitting, you are looking 
forward and thinking of the appeal. We are behind you, hundred percent, we pray for you.” 
Another man joined him: “I don’t think we have any questions. You are the lawyer, we are not”, 
upon which the membership laughed partly amused by the handing over of authority so bluntly 
but also partly uncomfortable because the lawyer’s presence should be appreciated by asking 
questions. It was then Sakwe Balintulo’s term to speak. He is the first named plaintiff in the 
Khulumani lawsuit (Balintulo et al. vs. Daimler AG et al.) and is always given a slot to speak.49 
He is old and his voice is so soft that members can hardly hear him: “It is important that we are 
patient. These things don’t come easily. We have to wait. Mandela waited for 27 years [in 
prison]”. 
It was another female member who caused a small uproar. She started by tuning into the 
general gratefulness and then went on to ask: “My question is, I am not going to hold back: 
how much longer are we going to wait [for the money to be paid out]?” The reason for the 
uproar is not that the question would be irrelevant to members, on the contrary. It was 
considered rude, or brave at the very least, to ask what may question the lawyer’s efforts. He, 
in turn, replied in reference to the South African government’s opposition to the cases for many 
years. “Yes, tata Balintulo is right, we must be patient. But it’s a real question of how long 
still?” He said that had there been “a government that was a little bit stronger behind us, perhaps 
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it might have been a different outcome”. He assured the membership that “if I look at all of you 
and also myself: My wish and desire is that this matter should be resolved as quickly as 
possible” and elaborated on the two approaches they always had: the legal and the political. 
“And when there was enough political will not just among Khulumani but among everyone, 
everyone, there may have been a different outcome.” 
A man responded that he had indeed not seen any political will right through the three 
administrations, from Mandela to Mbeki and Zuma. In the Groote Schuur Minutes of 199050, 
“Tata Mandela said there isn’t going to be any reparations for victims and also no arrest for 
perpetrators. And then Thabo Mbeki came into power and he used our money”. The 
membership was, at that stage, torn between excitement and surprise. Some were visibly angry 
and tried to hush the speaker. It is rare to hear Nelson Mandela being attacked for not thinking 
for the victims. The majority of members are loyal ANC members and would evaluate 
successive presidents for their faithfulness to Mandela’s heritage. 
The fact that Charles Abrahams, as a lawyer, uttered the possibility to critically engage 
with the government gave the impetus for such articulations. It was then a young representative 
from the rural branch of Khulumani stood up and called for action, in English: 
Chief! […]  
Is there any strategy in terms of dealing or strategizing around how do we engage with the current 
government? […] Because I believe in a way we need a more militant approach in terms of 
reparations […] We need to sit down and strategize how do we engage militantly this reluctant 
government. […] 
A militant approach, chief! 
While he spoke, members muttered and mumbled in agreement; when he finished, they 
applauded. Everyone was curious what the lawyer had to say in response to this youthful and 
well-spoken person and his quest. Such words were unheard and it clearly represented a new, 
second, generation of members who advocated new ways of engaging with government on the 
issue of reparations. This young man used to work for the government and one clearly heard it 
in the rhetoric he chose. Charles Abrahams responded: 
I owe the chief a response. […] I have got to be very wary about my position because first and 
foremost I am a lawyer. And you are asking me, and in fact all the other questions prompted, a 
political response. So accept my response not as a lawyer; so that you accept it was as an 
individual that’s been involved in these lawsuits. I just want to make that clear. […] As you know 
lawyers are very restricted in what they can say and what they can’t say. [understanding murmurs 
in the public.][…] 
Now stepping outside the realm of being a lawyer: I think you are right. We need to up the pace 
[applause in the public.] […] It is not militant in the sense of being destructive but we need to 
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really show that we are very serious about this matter. […] So that hopefully it is not another nine 
years before this matter is being resolved. […] 
An elderly man took forth the critical stance on government which had emerged, and he 
was loudly cheered: “I think it is up to us to put pressure on government. Whenever there are 
elections coming up, [the ANC] will come to the communities and pick up old people to vote 
for them. Let’s use that channel, let’s make our voice heard and say that we are not going to 
vote because they are not considering what we are saying.” He suggested active opposition 
against being instrumentalized for party politics. Such activity, of cause, also means passivity 
as he proposed to abstain from voting. 
The next contribution showed that, at the end of the day, it is details with a huge impact 
on their everyday life which members are struggling with. A man said: “People are dying 
without getting anything. My question is to you, Charles: is there a provision for us as plaintiffs 
when we die that our dependents will get something when this matter is resolved?” Mr. 
Abrahams was then said good-bye with songs celebrating him and Khulumani, making 
members dance and cheer. 
In sum, upon provocation by a young member and in a move which only persons of law 
can successfully perform, Mr Abrahams proposed a shift of perspective from the legal to the 
political through his own personhood. He drew the line between the legal and the political and 
momentarily left the one for the other. In effect, of cause, he also confirmed the demarcation of 
the two. He offered solidarity beyond professional advice and reasserted members that legal 
actions have to be paralleled with political actions.51 This shift from the legal to the political 
realm facilitated various articulations which probed what he advocated. For members, the legal 
realm remained obscure in its technicality but it became possible to engage with it publicly in 
the meeting and make it tangible for collective political action.52 
The meeting is the result of years of conscientization. No-one needs to explain to 
members what the apartheid regime inflicted upon them and what the effects are up to today. 
But the formulation of one’s own victimhood into a political victim subjectivity, i.e. a critical 
quest of recognition and attention from the former liberation movements and the current 
government, is a different thing. It could only come about by an emancipation of one’s own 
victim subjectivity from the official discourse that clashes with personal Party solidarity, with 
the search for reliable leadership, with hopes long upheld, and, most importantly, from one’s 
bodily sedimented victimhood. 
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I suggest that a legal process offered a crucial possibility for members to momentarily 
see their elected leaders in a different light. In that meeting, the legal became tangible and 
personally meaningful in the shape of the political and started to form the basis for political 
collective action. Members’ victim subjectivities successfully became politicized in this safe 
environment of a public realm shaped by familiar solidarity. 
The condition for the possibility of articulating one’s victimhood politically is the 
(momentary) emancipation from the bodily dimension of victimhood. Hence, bodily 
experiences are not only the basis for the formation of the political which Mr. Phelane’s account 
shows to a lower degree and Ms Mabilia’s to a bigger degree, it is also the dimension which 
requires emancipation from in order to be politically effective – the failure of which I showed 
with the account on Ms Mabasa where her sedimented knowledge of her victimhood emerged 
in all its rawness. 
Conclusion 
In May 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) gazetted regulations for assistance to 
victims in respect of basic education and higher education and in relation to medical benefits 
for apartheid-era victims and their dependents, and invited responses. The regulations indicated 
that only those some 21’000 victims who were identified by the TRC were eligible. The 
President’s Fund from which the payments should be sourced has accumulated almost R1billion 
since its establishment in the mid-1990s.53 Civil society was appalled by the proposal. For years, 
they had tried to be part of the decision how the Fund should contribute to the reconstruction 
of the country, pushing the state to finally release the money, and suggested community 
reparations and benefits to all victims – beyond the TRC’s list. They criticized the “closed list 
policy” and demanded that the current process be stopped until “meaningful consultation are 
carried out with victims and interested parties”.54 It was a set-back for civil society after years 
of closed or public meetings with the DOJ, the President and the TRC Unit and what was 
believed to be small steps towards a more inclusive notion of victimhood. The DOJ had, 
notwithstanding the increased attention on its handling of post-TRC matters, decided to apply 
the officially recognized list of the TRC. It thus decided against the database of Khulumani 
Support Group or a follow-up of the TRC to have more victims testify. 
The list proves persistent. Government had, 17 years ago as a result of negotiations and 
by way of the TRC Act of 1995, decided on a model of dealing with the past. I showed above 
that it was, in effect, a form of governance which leaves traces and is not easily revised. But 
what does this form of governance mean beyond a list and inclusion and exclusion for public 
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benefits? What is at stake here, I suggest, is what post-apartheid South Africa is based on: its 
myth of having overcome the cruel and unjust past. The list is in essence a list of injustices 
redressed and abolished. By defining a category of victims and paying out reparations to all that 
fall into the category, Government does not only provide resources to a select few; it attempts 
to define and provide the public good of a post-conflict political order. This governing process 
was at first a typical example of an interventionist measure. As many interventionist measures, 
it did not fully reach its aim, but remains hotly contested and challenged. What is more, it 
influenced the formation of political subjectivities. An interventionist measure thus triggered 
the emergence of other, less interventionist forms of governance. We can only understand the 
trajectory of governance if we take both into account. 
In this chapter, I first traced the emergence of a particular victim subject position in the 
course of the TRC process and then showed how this interventionist measure was objected and 
resisted in legal actions, paralleled by increasingly organized forms of contacts and activities 
among apartheid-era victims. I then analyzed the scope and limits of forms of governance “from 
below”, based on shared personal experiences rendered politically relevant by an interventionist 
categorisation. For victims’ agency to make a political victim subjectivity effective in their 
everyday lives, I emphasized experience, or in other words: habit memories, as one of the 
driving factors. Is the persistence of incorporated knowledge a source of resistance against 
governance? I argued that the sedimentation of habit memories is not only the source of agency 
but also what puts limits to agency and a successful political articulation. Especially so when 
the body is, in various ways, damaged. The outcome is hence contingent on the bodily 
dimension of victimhood and precisely because of the bodily dimension of victimhood – or of 
being human. I hence suggest to expand any analysis of governance and agency with the 
embodiment of experiences. 
To include embodiment of experiences in our analysis of governing processes would 
also mean to carefully re-think the effects of governance measures in terms of outreach into 
social space. It would mean to ask for the effects of governing processes on the possibilities of 
sociability. In which ways do governing processes – through their discursive formation of 
differentiation – impact on the possibilities of sociability? In the case at hand it is important to 
differentiate between the effects of norms established through processes of governance and the 
nonnegotiable boundaries in communicating injuries to others. In the article, I followed the line 
of argument that the bodily dimension of victimhood dissipates at the advantage of politically 
more applicable forms of articulating victimhood. Does this formalization of articulation 
towards dominant forms of victimhood result in a distancing from one’s own experience or is 
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it simple a learned way which may bear the possibility of shifts in subjectivity away from 
overwhelmingly sentient victimhood? 
Governing processes open up possibilities of political action, but they also impose 
constraints on social actors to emancipate from the cementation of definitions and subject 
positions.55 I tried to show that experience in the shape of sedimented knowledge is the source 
of any political articulation. However, the developments in courts and the political reactions to 
legal actions suggest that the political often emancipates, moves beyond and develops a logic 
of its own. This, in turn, is effective in everyday life in contingent ways and forces the 
cementation of distanced subject position or fosters the articulation of new forms of political 
subjectivities. This process is at the heart of a conceptualizing of governance which builds on 
the relationship between the individual and the political. 
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1 Research would not have been possible without the assistance and trust of the executive and the members 
of Khulumani Western Cape, various members of other provincial branches, the national board and the national 
office in Johannesburg, nor without the generous mentorship of Fiona Ross. I am indebted to all of them. Further, 
I wish to thank Richard Wilson for his insightful comments, Gregor Dobler for his questions that helped me to 
develop my arguments and the editors of this volume who introduced me to debates on governance with a 
commitment which is strictly empirical and highly inspiring. This article was written while I was a visiting 
researcher at the Human Rights Institute at the University of Connecticut with a grant from the Swiss National 
Research Foundation. 
2 Despite the rapidly growing number of truth commissions (more than 30 since the 1980s) and other so-
called transitional instruments, the institutions have so far been promoted on weak evidence for their success. 
Governments, commissioners (especially of the “successful” South African Truth Commission but also of the 
earlier models in Chile and Argentina), and the global transitional justice think-tank have long turned into major 
agents in shaping the transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule by advocating what has grown into a 
supposedly universally applicable model of transition (Scheuzger 2009). However, scholars and practitioners have 
also grown more critical as to the positive effects of a truth commission and point out the limitations of its mandate, 
the underestimated time aspect of reconciliation and the normative approach to truth. As to how to “evaluate”, 
though, there seems to be a striking loss (for an exceptional attempt, see Chapman and Merwe 2008). 
3 I conducted field research in South Africa in 2006 (6 months), and, for my doctoral thesis, in 2009 (10 
months) and 2010 (3 months). I worked with the South African apartheid-era victims organization Khulumani 
Support Group first as a volunteer and later as PhD candidate with occasional volunteering for the organization. 
Throughout, I shared many members’ everyday lives and witnessed their involvement in the organization, 
prominently in the Western Cape but also in the former Transkei and the provinces of Gauteng, Mpumalanga and 
KwaZulu Natal. 
4 Connerton distinguishes three types of memory: personal, cognitive and habitual. The third category is 
particularly under-researched: habit memory is the “capacity to reproduce a certain performance” (Connerton 
1989, p. 22). We cannot necessarily recall the moment when we acquired a particular piece of knowledge. What 
characterizes this kind of memory is its recognition and demonstration via performance. In other words: we do it 
the way we have always done it after a phase of (cognitive) learning. Examples are riding a bike or swimming. 
For the acquisition of a technique such as swimming and the notion of learned habit and habitus, see Mauss 1934 
and also Bourdieu 1977; and for a scholarship sensitive to sensory cognition, see Stoller 1997. 
5 See for instance Bozzoli 1998, Norval 2001, Wilson 2001, Posel and Simpson 2003, Doxader and Villa-
Vicencio 2004, Cole 2007. 
6 According to the Act, victims are “(a) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, 
suffered harm in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial 
impairment of human rights (i) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; or (ii) as a result of an act associated 
with a political objective for which amnesty has been granted; (b) persons who, individually or together with one 
or more persons, suffered harm in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a 
substantial impairment of human rights, as a result of such person intervening to assist persons contemplated in 
                                                      
 26 
                                                                                                                                                                         
paragraph (a) who were in distress or to prevent victimization of such persons; and (c) such relatives or dependants 
of victims as may be prescribed” (The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, Chapter 1 
(1)). 
7 According to the Act, a gross human rights violation is a violation of human rights “through (a) the 
killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment on any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, 
instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts 
of the past and which was committed during the period 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994 within or outside the 
Republic, and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by any person 
acting with a political motive” (The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, Chapter 1(1); 
as amended in Act 104 of 1996, section 21(a)). 
8 In his classic work on violence, Galtung (1969) differentiates between direct and structural violence, of 
which the latter has no identifiable actor: “Violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances” (1969, p. 171). It is the physical aspect of direct violence, often a violation 
of political right such as murder, torture, maiming and wounding, which are more likely to attract our attention 
(Nordstrom 2004). Economic, social, and cultural rights are widely neglected in transitional justice processes 
around the world (Schmid 2009). 
9 See Buur (1999) for a detailed account on how the Commission eventually settled on its decision to not 
recognize a victim without an act of violence and a perpetrator. In the South African case, according to Cronin 
(1999), the systemic would include “mass forced removals, the Pass Laws, the Bantustans, and the whole apparatus 
of decades-long territorial ‘ethnic cleansing’, all of which resulted in mass malnutrition, high levels of infant 
mortality and low life expectancy” (1999, p. 6). 
10 This is in line with what Wilson (1997) argues for human rights discourse more general: subjective 
meanings are sacrificed for the objective legal facts because of the discourse’s reliance on particular and 
decontextualized events. 
11 The TRC received statements from 21’290 persons of whom “more than 19’050 persons were found to 
be victims of a gross violation of human rights”. In addition, 2’975 persons were identified as victims during the 
amnesty process (Truth and Reconciliation Commission South Africa 2003: vol.7, Foreword, p.1). The application 
relied on definitions which the commissioners partly adjusted in the course of their work (Buur 1999, Wilson 2001, 
Ross 2003). For instance, a Special Hearing on Women was set up upon the intervention of women’s groups and 
activists (Goldblatt and Meintjes 1996). See also Goldblatt and Meintjes (1997) on how the TRC dealt with sexual 
violence against women and Ross (2003) on the emergence of “women” as a category. Aronson (2011) gives a 
detailed account on how disappeared and missing persons were defined by the Act and the Commission’s work. 
Also what constituted a crime committed with a political objective was contested and the Commission, in effect 
and to the dissatisfaction of many, focused on whether the act was executed upon the order of, or on behalf of, the 
state or a political organization (Bhargava 2002). 
12 For a critique of the lack of historical perspective in the Commission’s work and Final Report, see also 
Bonner and Nieftagodien (2003). 
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13 Only few authors touch on the question of how the Commission created of a particular victim subject 
position and the effects on people’s lives in the aftermath of the Commission (Kaminer et al. 2001, Humphrey 
2003, Posel and Simpson 2003, Colvin 2004a, Madlingozi 2007, Gunn and Krwala 2008, Backer 2010). 
14 See Ross 2003, p. 172 and 2002, p. 163 for a listing of reasons why people decided not to testify. 
15 See also Norval, this volume. 
16 Khulumani’s homepage can be accessed here: http://khulumani.net. Roughly a fifth of the membership 
testified before the TRC and is thus officially recognized as apartheid-era victims. Most members are in their 50s 
or older. The majority is unemployed and lives in the townships across South Africa. Only a fraction of 
Khulumani’s membership has actually sustained injuries from the narrowly defined violations as promoted by the 
TRC. 
17 Of course, speaking about effects is always a reference to the cause and to perpetration and guilt. 
Arguments of reparation necessarily oscillate between cause and effect. Depending on the context and the 
addressee, the public face of Khulumani emphasizes either cause or effect. For instance, in its damage complaint 
against corporations, the cause and the moments of violation are pivotal for the allegation that the defendant 
companies aided and abetted the apartheid regime in the perpetration of human rights. For the political advocacy 
work around the lawsuit, in contrast, the notion of effects on the today is much more prominent. 
18 As such, Khulumani Support Group is part of a wider movement in South Africa which demands the 
fulfilment of social and economic rights: Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shack 
dweller movement for public housing in Durban, Pietermaritzberg und Cape Town, Symphony Way in Cape Town 
(Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers 2011), for instance. 
19 Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. The President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others; 1996 (4) SA 671, Constitutional Court of South Africa. The amnesty provision of the Interim 
Constitution and the challenge to it has been topic of various publications (Sarkin-Hughes 2004, Van Marle 2007, 
Sarkin 2008). 
20 The Commission, in its Final Report, also argued for concessions in a country of transition by 
acknowledging that perpetrators were the primary source of information. It saw the promise of amnesty as crucial 
for perpetrators to come forward to unveil and reveal information (Truth and Reconciliation Commission South 
Africa 1998: vol.1, ch.5). 
21 “Prosecuting Policy and Directives Relating to Prosecution of Offenses Emanating from Conflicts of 
the Past and Which Were Committed on or Before 11 May 1994”, promulgated December 1, 2005, Appendix A. 
For a detailed outline of the amendments and its first implementation before they were struck down by the High 
Court in Pretoria, see Mallinder 2009, pp. 115–127. 
22 Nkadimeng and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (32709/07) (2008) 
ZAGPHC 422 (http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/422.html&query=nkadimeng; 
last visited April 7, 2014). The representative organizations were Khulumani Support Group, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). 
23 Thembisile Phumelele Nkadimeng and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutors and Others.; 
case no.: 32709/07 (2008); date: December 12, 2008;  paragraph 15.4.3.1. 
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24 The SACTJ comprises the Khulumani Support Group, CSVR, ICTJ, the South African History Archives 
(SAHA), the Human Rights Media Centre (HRMC), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the Freedom 
of Expression Institute (FRI) and the Trauma Centre for Victims of Torture and Trauma. 
25 CSVR and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; case no.: 15320/09 (2009), 
date: April 29, 2009; ZAGPPHC (http://www.saflii.org/cgi-
bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2009/35.html&query=%20csvr; last visited April 7, 2014). 
26 Under section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). 
27 See paragraph 7.4.3 and 8 in CSVR and Others. v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.; 
case no: 15320/09 (2009); date April 28, 2009; North Gauteng Court, Pretoria. One of the pardon applicants, Ryan 
Albutt, who is a member of the right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, the President and the Minister of 
Justice asked the Constitutional Court to grant leave to appeal against the order of the High Court. In February 
2010, the Constitutional Court at the same time granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. 
28 In the original Khulumani complaint, 23 defendant multinationals and banks span six different countries 
and involve six different industries. The alleged distinct violations as formulated in the complaints are close to 
those the TRC recognized as gross violations of human rights: extrajudicial killing, torture, detention and cruel 
treatment, and, in the Ntsebeza case, forced removals. 
29 The ATS gives jurisdiction to US District Courts for any civil action by an alien for a tort which was 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States, whether it arose in the US or abroad. 
U.S. District Courts are trial courts and part of the federal court system. They have jurisdiction to hear federal 
cases on both civil and criminal matters. - The Alien Tort Statute dates back to 1789 when George Washington 
signed legislation for an anti-piracy bill (28 U.S.C. §1350). The Statute lay practically dormant for almost 200 
years but it has been the basis of some hundred lawsuits since 1980. In the mid-1990s, many Holocaust-related 
litigations gave visibility to the rapidly growing and worldwide phenomenon that the ATS was hoped to bring to 
justice specifically those who commit human rights violations. The Alien Tort Statute has been discussed at length 
by numerous authors and legal experts and is seen, on the one extreme, as the ultimate expression of US legal 
imperialism or, on the other side, is heralded as the last option that potentially establishes that private companies 
can be held accountable for breaches of international law and international human rights standards (Mattei 2003, 
Shamir 2004, Stephens et al. 2008). 
30 The plaintiffs’ attorneys filed the Second Amended Complaints according to Judge Scheindlin’s order 
(see also Kesselring (2012a). The defendants then filed yet another appeal to dismiss. The Appeal Court heard the 
appeal on January, 15 2010. In the meantime, a case against Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kiobel and Others v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company and Others) took the lead in ATS matters. It came as a shock to the international human 
rights movements when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on September 17, 2010 that companies could 
not be held liable for violations of international human rights law. Given that the application of the ATS became 
the core issue, it halted all the other cases filed under the provisions of the ATS.  
31 See my PhD thesis (2012b) for a detailed account on the opposition and support of the apartheid 
litigations over the years. 
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32 The Maduna Declaration can be accessed on the website of the South African Government: 
http://www.gov.za/speeches/2003/03073010461001.htm (last visited April 7, 2014). 
33 Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe communicated to the Court that it was «now of the view that this Court 
is an appropriate forum to hear the remaining claims of aiding and abetting in violation of international law» and 
also offered Government’s assistance to mediate a probable settlement. This shift was not reiterated publicly by 
his Ministry. However, it did not submit any statement in response to the Appeal Court’s quest for advice for the 
hearing on the defendants’ appeal to dismiss in January 2010. The letter is available on the Khulumani website: 
http://www.khulumani.net/khulumani/documents/file/12-min.justice-jeff-radebe-letter-to-us-court-2009.html 
(last visited April 7, 2014). 
34 I do not call this a political victimhood. However, this should not undermine the fact that victimhood is 
always formed as a consequence of the political and the social. 
35 In October 2010, I spent two days with the women and mainly wanted to understand their concerns and 
activities in comparison to other areas than where I have worked extensively and over periods of months and years. 
At the end of the first day, I was, by surprise and against my intention, expected to interview some of the women 
who seem to have come forward voluntarily. As this is something I would only do with people I have met several 
times and after having ensured that I could come back anytime to check on them, I suggested a group interview. I 
thought it may divert the potential heaviness in such “story-telling” conversations. Simphiwe Shabalala, a 
volunteer and youth activist for Khulumani, translated from seSotho to English. – For more on my methodology, 
see Kesselring (2012b). 
36  In 1990, two massacres occurred in Sebokeng, in July and September. In the early 1990, almost 
uncountable massacres took place in the then Transvaal (today Gauteng) region such as the Boipatong massacre 
on June 17, 1992 (when over 100 people were massacred while asleep in their homes during a raid by IFP hostel 
dwellers). Often there were caused by attacks by hostel dwellers on township communities and vice-versa (see 
Bonner and Nieftagodien (2003)) 
37 The Final Report of the TRC (1998: vol.3, ch.6) interpreted the violence in party political terms: The 
increase in violence coincided with the establishment of Inkatha Freedom Party as a national political party in July 
1990. In competition to the ANC and UDF, the IFP attempted to develop a political base in the Transvaal. For an 
alternative and much more nuanced and historical reading, see Bonner and Nieftagodien (Bonner and Nieftagodien 
2003). 
38 Another women in the round mentioned that the community would not believe that their husbands died 
a political death and accused their wife they had killed or hid their husbands to get their money. The widows also 
mentioned accusations of witchcraft to me. For what it means to be a “political widow” in today South Africa, see 
for instance Ramphele (1997).  
39 She probably referred to another massacre in Sebokeng which gained considerably more public 
attention, the Nangalembe Night Vigil massacre of January 1991, when 47 mourners were killed at the night vigil 
of the funeral of a comrade. Then President Mandela unveiled the monument on 21 March 1996. 
40 Ms Mabaso’s “case” may be taken up by an advocacy group (or by a researcher like myself) and frame 
the story as political action. She herself, however, can only with utmost difficulties learn how to speak discursively 
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more effective; she needs facilitation which may or may not bear the chance for a subjectively positive shift of her 
victim subjectivity. 
41 For Special Pension, those South Africans qualify who were prevented from providing for a pension 
because they sacrificed more than five years of their lives for the liberation struggle in their full-time service for a 
liberation movements before 1990. Alternatively, the person could also have been imprisoned or detained for any 
offence committed with a political objective. According to the latest Amendment to the Act no. 69 of 1996 (2008) 
which was enacted to give effect to Section 189 of the Constitution, the applicant must not yet have been 30 years 
or older on December 1, 1996. 
42 On April 15, 2003, Mbeki announced the once-off payment of R30 000 as individual reparations 
(Statement by President Mbeki to the National House of Parliament and the Nation, at the Tabling of the Report 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Issued by the Office of the Presidency, 15 April 2003). Conversely, 
the TRC recommended that each victim of a gross human rights violation as defined by the TRC should receive a 
financial grant of between 17 000 to 23 000 rand per year for six years. 
43 See Madlingozi (2007) for a slightly different use of such victim subject position. “Bad victims”, 
according to him, are those who claim reparations, campaign for social justice and, as such, “expose the poverty 
of this elite compromise, which involves maintaining the ill-gotten gains provided that a section of the new elite 
is placed in positions of economic power and privilege” (2007, p. 12). “Good victims” are those who belong to the 
new elite, have been well connected as members of liberation movements, profit of the new access to wealth in 
post-1994 and generally can afford not to demand reparations. Madlingozi thus places the emphasis in his 
distinction between those “mostly ordinary and often poor township residents” (also those who, according to 
Madlingozi, and Fullard and Rousseau (2004) made up the bulk of those 21’000 who testified to the TRC) who 
demand reparations and a new elite which holds high positions in government and corporate positions due to their 
close ties to the former liberation movements and the today ruling party ANC. For the former, he takes the example 
of Khulumani Support Group and treats it as a homogenous group. 
44 Chris Hani became involved in anti apartheid protests, joined the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto 
we Sizwe, went into exile 1962 and later became the leader of the South African Communist Party and head of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe. He was assassinated in April 1993. 
45 They are a remnant and a continuum of meetings held at the Trauma Centre which offered counseling 
to ex-political prisoners and survivors of torture in the post-TRC years. For a detailed analysis of what was 
Khulumani Western Cape then, see Colvin 2004a, 2004b.  
46 South African attorney Charles Abrahams is partner in a small law firm called Abrahams&Kiewitz 
Attorneys in Belleville, Western Cape just outside Cape Town, which specializes on public interest and human 
rights cases. He finished his Master degree in International Law at the University of Cape Town and wrote his 
thesis on the question of the apartheid debt. Jubilee South Africa then used his research for its campaign on the 
matter and he became Jubilee’s legal advisor. Later, he was sanctioned by Khulumani Support Group to be the 
South Africa attorney for the potential apartheid litigation, together with American attorney Mr Michael Hausfeld 
as their US counterpart with his expertise of the Alien Tort Statute. Abrahams&Kiewitz worked on South African 
cases against Anglo Platinum (re displacement), AngloGold Ashanti (re silicosis), Gencor (re asbestosis), and 
bread companies testing the instrument of class actions in South Africa, amongst others. 
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47 More specifically, the majority decision ruled that the Alien Tort Statute cannot be used to sue 
corporations for violations of international law because customary international law only confers jurisdiction over 
natural persons. One of the three judges, Pierre N. Leval wrote a strong dissent of the majority opinion – noting 
that the majority’s (Chief Justice Dennis Jacobs and José A. Cabranes) reasoning would be a “substantial blow to 
international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human rights” 
(http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/3b6c7a2e-4d70-4306-973e-d0ed3eff5b40/1/doc/06-4800-
cv_opn.pdf; last visited April 7, 2014). 
48 The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing the case but the Court of Appeals left intact the original ruling 
with a 5-5 split on February 4, 2011. The plaintiffs then filed their certiorari petition at the Supreme Court on June 
6, 2011 which was granted on October 17. The hearing took place on February 28, 2012 and on March 3, the Court 
ordered that the case should be re-heard and invited briefs about the issue of extraterritorial application of the ATS 
On April 17, 2013, the Court’s majority (with three concurring opinions) found that there is a presumption against 
the extraterritorial application. The presumption can be overcome when the matter “touches and concerns” the US 
with “sufficient force”. The case was originally consolidated with Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. in which 
Ken Wiwa, son of Nigerian activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, executed in 1995, and other members of the 
“Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People” sued Shell with similar allegations as formulated in the Kiobel 
versus Shell case. The latter was settled out of court in 2009. 
49 Sakwe Balintulo stands as personal representative for his late brother Sabe Balintulo who was shot dead 
by the South Africa Police on March 15, 1973 along with fifteen others. 
50 The Groote Schuur Minute refer to the conclusion of negotiations between the unbanned ANC and the 
National Party Government signed in Cape Town on May 4, 1990, three months after the release of Nelson 
Mandela. The negotiations were about the release of the hundreds of lower ranking political prisoners which were 
still held in South African prisons and the immunity from prosecution of political exiles returning to South Africa. 
Together with the conclusion of negotiations in Pretoria in August 1990 (the Pretoria Minute), they led to the 
passing of the Indemnity Act 1990 which empowered the President to grant indemnity from prosecution "either 
unconditionally or on the conditions he may deem fit". The issue of amnesty for security forces of the National 
Party regime and the release of political prisoners was later a central point of disagreement during the CODESA 
talks. 
51 It is important to note that he obviously thought it a moment conducive to such actions. There were also 
times when the cautioned members from going off marching to the parliament. It was when he considered too 
much visibility of the political and social grounding of the lawsuit as potentially harming legal success.  
52 It was also the first time that the lawyer so openly and unambiguously suggested an out-of-court 
settlement as the only way forward. The first out of court settlement overture from the defendant companies came 
from General Motors in March 2011. This offer is widely put in the context of GM’s insolvency and the US 
Courts urging it to settle pending cases. Although, due to its liquidation status, GM was no longer part of the main 
legal apartheid action, Khulumani’s leading lawyer Michael Hausfeld managed to negotiate a settlement in 
February 2012. The settlement, US$1.5 million worth of shares of the company, was between Motors 
Liquidation Company (formerly known as General Motors Corporations), General Unsecured Creditors 
(GUC) Trust and the South African claimants. Although the Court’s order does not require an admission of 
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liability by GM and the amount is insignificantly small per victim, the attorney and the plaintiffs judged it 
nonetheless as a step towards corporate accountability (see also Kesselring 2012a). 
53 The President’s Fund was established for the purpose of supporting victims of gross human rights 
violations during apartheid. It was part of the TRC’s recommendations to the President (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission South Africa 2003, pp. vol.6, section 2, ch.5). Many states such as the Swiss and the German 
contributed to the Fund. No clear policy of how the money should be used had been developed up until the 
gazetting of the regulations.  
54 The statement of the South African Coalition for Transitional Justice can be accessed on: 
http://khulumani.net/reparations/government/item/499-no-cohesion-without-reparations-%E2%80%93-the-
struggle-for-inclusive-and-comprehensive-reparations-a-view-from-the-south-african-coalition-for-transitional-
justice.html (last visited April 7, 2014). 
55 For a stronger emphasis on the role of the law and the legal process in the formation of victim 
subjectivities, see my PhD dissertation (2012b). 
